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Abstract. We study the resilience of complex networks against attacks in
which nodes are targeted intelligently, but where disabling a node has a cost
to the attacker which depends on its degree. Attackers have to meet these costs
with limited resources, which constrains their actions. A network’s integrity is
quantified in terms of the efficacy of the process that it supports. We calculate how
the optimal attack strategy and the most attack-resistant network degree statistics
depend on the node removal cost function and the attack resources. The resilience
of networks against intelligent attacks is found to depend strongly on the node
removal cost function faced by the attacker. In particular, if node removal costs
increase sufficiently fast with the node degree, power law networks are found to
be more resilient than Poissonian ones, even against optimised intelligent attacks.
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1. Introduction
In recent years there have been several studies into the resilience of complex networks
against random failures and targeted attacks, in which a fraction of the nodes or of the
bonds are removed. It was found that scale-free networks (with degree distributions
that decay slowly via power laws, as in preferential attachment models) are more
robust against random node removal than Poissonnian (or Erdo¨s-Re´nyi) graphs, which
may explain why many real-world complex systems involve networks with power-law
distributed degrees. However, scale-free networks were found to be very vulnerable
to intelligent attackers that target high-degree nodes [1, 2]. Against edge removal,
Poissonian and power law networks turned out to produce similar responses [3]. There
are two reasons why we aim to study network resilience further. First, while the
motivation behind such studies is that the networks provide the infrastructure for
some process (with interacting ‘agents’ or processors occupying the nodes), and that
process disruption is the true goal of an attacker, most authors measure the impact of
attacks indirectly, via topological properties that serve as proxies for the integrity of
the process (e.g. the overall connectivity and path-length statistics [4], or percolation
characteristics [1, 2, 5, 6, 7]). Here we seek to quantify the damage inflicted by attacks
directly in terms of the process which the network is meant to support, similar to [8].
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This requires solving stochastic processes on complex networks with arbitrary degree
distributions, which is what statistical mechanics enable us to do. Our second and
most important reason is that network resilience has so far been studied strictly in
the context of random or intelligent removal of a fixed fraction of sites or bonds.
This seems unrealistic. In most real-world scenarios (attacks on computer networks,
viruses attacking cellular networks, etc) attacking a highly connected node demands
more effort on behalf of the attacker than removing a weakly connected one. Similarly,
any sensible defender of a network would devote more resources to the protection of
‘hubs’ than to the protection of ‘outpost’ nodes. The study of network resilience
against attack or dilution calls for more appropriate and realistic definitions, that
include the inevitable resource constraints faced by attackers and defenders alike.
Turning to a formulation where attackers have finite resources, to be deployed
intelligently when the cost of removing a network node depends on the degree of that
node, changes the game drastically. It introduces a trade-off between the merit in
terms of inflicted damage of targeting high-degree nodes versus the disadvantage of
associated cost (attacking many ‘hubs’ may be inaffordable). One would like to know
the maximum amount of damage that can be inflicted (by e.g. a virus to a biological
network), given the limited resources available to the attacker (e.g. food, lifetime) and
given the network’s degree-dependent node removal costs. Similarly one would like to
identify the most resilient network degree statistics to withstand an optimal attack.
The answers to these questions may aid our understanding of structural properties
of biological (e.g. proteomic) signalling networks, where competition and natural
selection act as driving forces towards attack resistance, but also to aid the design of
attack-resistant synthetic real-world (e.g. communication) networks.
Here we develop a framework for the study of network resilience that includes
limited attack resources, degree-dependent node removal costs, and resilience measures
based on process integrity. We consider two types of processes where structurally
different interacting variables are placed on the nodes of networks with arbitrary
degree distributions: interacting Ising spins (where global order is ferromagnetic or of
the spin-glass type), and coupled Kuramoto oscillators (where global order is measured
by synchronization). Both are solvable using finite connectivity replica theory, which
enables us to quantify their integrity by the critical temperature of the ordered state.
An attacker with finite resources seeks to destabilize these processes by removing or
disrupting selected network nodes using his knowledge of the network’s degrees. The
attacker is also allowed to disable nodes partially (with a proportional reduction in
attack costs). We identify the most damaging attack strategy, given a network’s degree
distribution and given the degree dependence of the node removal costs and the attack
resources available. We then determine the optimal network topology from the point of
view of the defender, i.e. that degree distribution for which the integrity of the process
is preserved best when attacked by a foe who employs the most damaging attack
strategy. The optimal attack strategy and the optimally attack-resistant network
topology are found to be universal across the types of microscopic variables and types
of global order considered. As expected, the resilience of network processes against
intelligent attacks depends strongly on the node removal cost function faced by the
attacker. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the traditional set-up where attackers are
allowed to remove a fixed fraction of the nodes (and hence can simply target the
‘hubs’), we find that if node removal costs increase sufficiently fast with the node
degree, and if attackers have finite resources to meet these costs, power law networks
are more resilient than Poissonian ones, even against optimised intelligent attacks.
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2. Definitions
2.1. Processes, supporting networks, and constrained attack variables
We study two systems in which interacting stochastic variables are placed on the N
nodes of a complex network. The network is defined via variables cij ∈ {0, 1}, with
cij = 1 if and only if the nodes i and j are connected. We define cij = cji and cii = 0
for all (i, j), and abbreviate c = {cij}. The first system (A) consist of N Ising spins
σi ∈ {−1, 1}, in thermal equilibrium, characterized by the following Hamiltonian
A: H(σ) = −
∑
i<j
cijJijξiξjσiσj (1)
with σ = (σ1, . . . , σN ). The second system (B) consist of N Kuramoto oscillators,
with phases θi ∈ [−π, π], again in equilibrium but now with the Hamiltonian
B: H(θ) = −
∑
i<j
cijJijξiξj cos(θi − θj) (2)
with θ = (θ1, . . . , θN ). The bonds Jij ∈ IR are drawn randomly and independently
from a distribution P (J). The variables ξi ∈ Ξ ⊆ [0, 1] in (1,2) represent the impact
of attacks, with ξi = 0 if node i is removed completely and ξi = 1 if it is left alone. We
demand that 1 ∈ Ξ, so leaving a node intact is always an option, and for simplicity
we take Ξ to be discrete and finite. We define the node degrees ki(c) =
∑
j cij , so the
degree distribution and the average connectivity of c are p(k|c) = N−1∑i δk,ki(c) and
〈k〉 =∑k≥0 kp(k|c), respectively.
We assume that the cost to the attacker of setting ξi = ξ at a node of degree
ki = k is ψ(ξ, k) ≥ 0, where ψ(1, k) = 0 and ∂ψ(ξ, k)/∂ξ ≤ 0 for all ξ ∈ Ξ. If attackers
have limited resources they can only disrupt a subset of the nodes, since the {ξi} will
now be subject to a constraint of the form
∑
i ψ(ξi, ki) ≤ C. A natural choice for ψ is
ψ(ξ, k) = κ(1−ξ)φ(k) (3)
where φ(k) is a non-decreasing function, with φ(0) = 0 and φ(k>0) > 0. The attack
cost for a node increases with the number of links to/from it; disconnected nodes
can be attacked for free. The normalization factor κ is chosen such that the resource
constraint takes the simple form N−1
∑
i ψ(ξi, ki) ≤ 1. The attacker is assumed to
act intelligently, using knowledge of the network’s degrees, so the degrees {ki} and
the attack variables {ξi} will generally be correlated. Finally we draw the network c
randomly from a maximum-entropy ensemble defined by a probability distribution in
which the degrees are constrained to take prescribed values k = (k1, . . . , kN ):
Prob(c) = Z−1[k]
∏
i
δki,ki(c), Z[k] =
∑
c
∏
i
δki,ki(c) (4)
We abbreviate p(ξ, k) = N−1
∑
i δξi,ξδki,k, and define q(ξ|k) via p(ξ, k) =
q(ξ|k)p(k). The resource constraint on the attack variables then translates into∑
ξk ψ(ξ, k)q(ξ|k)p(k) ≤ 1. The attacker is assumed to know the degree sequence
k of the network to be attacked, and can adapt accordingly the conditional likelihood
q(ξ|k) to maximize the impact of his actions; q(ξ|k) constitutes his attack strategy.
The realistic regime is that where ψ(ξ, k) obeys
∑
k ψ(0, k)p(k) > 1, so that the trivial
‘destroy-all’ attack strategy q(ξ|k) = δξ,0 ∀k is not feasible (i.e. too costly).
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2.2. Quantifying process integrity and optimal attack and defence strategies
With each process (1,2) running on the network and each associated ordered phase
(ferromagnetic, spin-glass, or synchronized) corresponds a critical temperature Tc,
which will for large N depend on the network and attack characteristics k and ξ only
via q(ξ|k) and p(k). The larger Tc, the more robust is the ordered phase against
local noise, so we can quantify the integrity of the process by the value of Tc[p, q]. The
attacker wants to destroy the ordered phase of the process, whereas the defender seeks
to protect it. This allows us to give precise definitions for the optimal attack strategy
and the optimally resistant degree distribution in terms of process integrity. The
optimal attack strategy q⋆[p] is the conditional distribution q(ξ|k) for which Tc[p, q] is
minimal, given the degree distribution p and given the resource constraint:
q⋆[p] = argmin{q,
∑
ξk
ψ(ξ,k)q(ξ|k)p(k)≤1}Tc[p, q] (5)
The optimal (most resistant) degree distribution p⋆ to be chosen by the defender,
given the average connectivity c (finite network resources) and attack cost function ψ
is then that p(k) which subsequently maximizes this q-minimized critical temperature:
p⋆ = argmax{p,
∑
k
kp(k)=c}Tc[p, q
⋆[p]]
= argmax{p,
∑
k
kp(k)=c}argmin{q,
∑
ξk
ψ(ξ,k)q(ξ|k)p(k)≤1}Tc[p, q]
(6)
The end result is a situation where the defender, by choosing an appropriate degree
distribution, maintains the highest achievable critical temperature Tc[p
⋆, q⋆[p⋆]], given
he is subjected to the most damaging attack. However, within this scenario one could
in fact ask many more interesting questions, such as what would be the effect of
misinformation, a situation where a defender optimizes the network on the basis of an
anticipated attack q⋆[p] (so he chooses degree distribution p⋆) but is then faced with
an attack with strategy q′ 6= q⋆[p], so that the actual critical temperature is Tc[p⋆, q′].
We see that the problem of identifying the optimal attack and defense strategies
(5,6) splits automatically into two distinct parts. The first part is calculating the
critical temperature(s) Tc[p, q] of the relevant phases. This is done by evaluating for
the systems (1,2) the asymptotic disorder-averaged free energy per spin f , from which
one extracts the phase diagrams for systems on typical graphs from (4):
fA = − lim
N→∞
1
βN
log
∑
σ
e−βH(σ) (7)
fB = − lim
N→∞
1
βN
log
∫ π
−π
dθ e−βH(θ) (8)
in which β = T−1 (where T denotes the temperature), and where · · · denotes averaging
over the disorder in the problem, viz. the randomly drawn graphs with statistics (4)
and the random bonds {Jij}. The calculation of (7) and (8) is done with the finite
connectivity replica method, based on the identity logZ = limn→0 n
−1 logZn, and
details are relegated to Appendix A and Appendix B in order not to disrupt the flow
of the paper. The second part of the problem, to be tackled once the formulae for
Tc[p, q] have been derived (which, expectedly and fortunately, turn out to be simple
and very similar across models and ordered phases), is to carry out the constrained
optimizations in (5,6), by a combination of analytical and numerical techniques.
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3. The process integrity measure
We show in the appendices of this paper that the critical temperatures Tc[p, q] for
the emergence of global (F or SG) order, given we choose the bond distribution
P (J) = 12 (1+ η)δ(J−J0) + 12 (1− η)δ(J+J0) (with J0 ≥ 0), follow for both Ising
spins and coupled oscillators from formulae of the following form:
F : λ(1)max(β) = 1, λ
(1) : eigenvalues of M
(1)
ξξ′ (β) = ηK(βJ0ξξ
′)γ(ξ′) (9)
SG : λ(2)max(β) = 1, λ
(2) : eigenvalues of M
(2)
ξξ′ (β) = K
2(βJ0ξξ
′)γ(ξ′) (10)
in which β = 1/T and
γ(ξ) = 〈k〉−1
∑
k
q(ξ|k)p(k)k(k − 1), (11)
Here K(z) = tanh(z) for interacting Ising spins and K(z) = I1(z)/I0(z) for coupled
oscillators. In both cases K(−z) = −K(z), ddzK(z) ≥ 0, and limz→∞K(z) = 1.
There is no F phase if η ≤ 0, so we take η > 0 from now on. The structure of the
above formulae is in agreement with results from percolation theory and spreading
phenomena, which show that the threshold characterizing the percolation transition
or an epidemic outbreak in a network depends on the ratio 〈k2〉/〈k〉 of the first two
moments of its degree distribution [1, 5, 6, 7, 2, 9, 10, 11]. The approach followed
here is closer to the envisaged picture of interacting agents or processors on network
nodes, and has the benefit of applying to the whole interval Ξ = [0, 1], as opposed to
Ξ = {0, 1} which can be accessed by percolation theory.
3.1. Tests and bounds for critical temperatures
Before any attack one has ξ ∈ {1}, so γ(ξ) = γ(1) = 〈k2〉/〈k〉 − 1 and the above
formulae would have reproduced the known results for the unperturbed system, viz.
F : ηK(βJ0)[〈k2〉/〈k〉 − 1] = 1 (12)
SG : K2(βJ0)[〈k2〉/〈k〉 − 1] = 1 (13)
Another simple test is to consider Ξ = {0, 1}. Here each node is either unaffected
or removed completely, leaving a new network identical to an unperturbed network
as described by (12,13), but with reduced size N ′ =
∑
i ξi, and with degrees
k′i =
∑
j cijξj . We would find, in the case of random attacks q(ξ|k) = ζδξ,0+(1−ζ)δξ,1:
〈k〉′ = lim
N→∞
1
(1−ζ)N
∑
ij
ξicijξj = (1−ζ)〈k〉 (14)
〈k2〉′ = lim
N→∞
1
(1−ζ)N
∑
ijℓ
ξicijciℓξjξℓ = (1−ζ)2〈k2〉+ ζ(1−ζ)〈k〉 (15)
giving the following transparent formulae for the post-attack transition points:
F : ηK(βJ0)(1−ζ)[〈k2〉/〈k〉 − 1] = 1 (16)
SG : K2(βJ0)(1−ζ)[〈k2〉/〈k〉 − 1] = 1 (17)
If, alternatively, we apply to this scenario the result (9,10), we find γ(ξ) =
q(ξ)[〈k2〉/〈k〉−1] andK(βJ0ξξ′) = K(βJ0)δξ,1δξ′,1, and the relevant matrices reduce to
M
(1)
ξξ′ (β) = ηK(βJ0)(1−ζ)[〈k2〉/〈k〉−1]δξ,1δξ′,1 andM (2)ξξ′ (β) = K2(βJ0)(1−ζ)[〈k2〉/〈k〉−
1]δξ,1δξ′,1. One solves the eigenvalue problems trivially, and indeed recovers (16, 17).
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A final trivial test is to consider q(ξ|k) = δξ,ξ0 , where ξ0 ∈ (0, 1), an attack equivalent
to replacing J0 → ξ20J0. Upon substituting this choice into (9,10) one confirms, via
γ(ξ) = δξ,ξ0 [〈k2〉/〈k〉−1], that our general theory indeed reduces to (12,13) with the
correctly reduced coupling strength.
Solving the eigenvalue problems (9,10) analytically is not always possible, but
eigenvalue bounds are obtained easily. Our matrices are of the form Mξξ′ =
L(ξξ′)γ(ξ′), where L(u) = ηK(βJ0u) for the F transition (so L(u) is anti-symmetric)
and L(u) = K2(βJ0u) for the SG transition (so L(u) is symmetric), and where γ(ξ) ≥ 0
for all ξ. We symmetrize the eigenvalue problem λx(ξ) =
∑
ξ′ Mξξ′x(ξ
′) by defining
y(ξ) = x(ξ)
√
γ(ξ), giving λy(ξ) =
∑
ξ′ [
√
γ(ξ)L(ξξ′)
√
γ(ξ′)]y(ξ′). This implies that
λmax = max
y
∑
ξξ′ y(ξ)
√
γ(ξ)L(ξξ′)
√
γ(ξ′)y(ξ′)∑
ξ y
2(ξ)
(18)
which can be simplified to
λmax = max
y
∑
ξξ′ y(ξ)
√
γ(ξ)L(|ξξ′|)
√
γ(ξ′)y(ξ′)∑
ξ y
2(ξ)
(19)
Variational arguments can now be applied in order to get lower bounds. In particular,
upon substituting y(ξ) = δξ,ξˆ and varying ξˆ one derives the statement
λmax ≥ max
ξ
{
γ(ξ)L(ξ2)
}
(20)
To find upper bounds, we use the fact that the maximum in (19) will have y(ξ) ≥ 0 for
all ξ. We then use the inequalities L(|u|) ≤ αηβJ0|u| (for F) and L(|u|) ≤ (αβJ0)2|u|2
(for SG), where α = 1 for Ising spins and α = 12 for coupled oscillators, to get
λ(1)max ≤ αηβJ0max
y
{∑
ξξ′ y(ξ)γ
1
2 (ξ)|ξ||ξ′|γ 12 (ξ′)y(ξ′)∑
ξ y
2(ξ)
}
(21)
λ(2)max ≤ (αβJ0)2max
y
{∑
ξξ′ y(ξ)γ
1
2 (ξ)|ξ|2|ξ′|2γ 12 (ξ′)y(ξ′)∑
ξ y
2(ξ)
}
(22)
The last two maxima are calculated easily, leading us to
F : Tc[p, q] ≤ ηαJ0
∑
ξ
ξ2γ(ξ) (23)
SG : Tc[p, q] ≤ αJ0
(∑
ξ
ξ4γ(ξ)
)1
2
(24)
3.2. Explicit simple form for a process integrity measure Γ[p, q]
The inequalities (23,24) become equalities for large c, where the critical temperatures
diverge and hence β → 0 in (12, 13); the right-hand sides of (23,24) then become the
true integrity measures of the process. Moreover, for certain natural choices of the set
Ξ the latter statement is in fact true for any connectivity c. For instance, if Ξ ⊆ {0, 1}
(all nodes are either fully disabled or left alone) one may use K(βJ0ξξ
′) = ξξ′K(βJ0)
to diagonalize the matrices in (9,10) and find
F :
1
K(J0/Tc[p, q])
= η
∑
ξ
ξ2γ(ξ) (25)
SG :
1
K(J0/Tc[p, q])
=
(∑
ξ
ξ4γ(ξ)
) 1
2
(26)
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which reveals that the critical temperatures are monotonically increasing functions of
the sums
∑
ξ ξ
2γ(ξ) for F-type order and
∑
ξ ξ
4γ(ξ) for SG-type order (for Ξ = {0, 1}
the two sums are in fact identical). In view of these properties, and in view of the
minor differences between the F and SG cases, in the remainder of this study we adopt
the quantity
∑
ξ ξ
2γ(ξ) as our integrity measure, giving
Γ[p, q] =
1
〈k〉
∑
ξk
ξ2q(ξ|k)p(k)k(k − 1) (27)
We define the set of relevant degrees k as S = {k > 1| p(k) > 0}. The optimal attack
strategy is then the choice q⋆[p] which solves the following optimization problem:
minimize : Γ[p, q] (28)
subject to : q(ξ|k) ≥ 0 ∀(ξ, k),
∑
ξ∈Ξ
q(ξ|k) = 1 ∀k ∈ S (29)
∑
ξ∈Ξ
∑
k∈S
(1−ξ)φ(k)q(ξ|k)p(k) ≤ κ−1 (30)
To avoid trivial pathologies we assume that ∃k ≥ 2 with p(k) > 0 (if untrue we would
not have an ordered state in the first place, as it would have given Tc[p, q] = 0), and
that
∑
k p(k)k(k − 1) <∞ (if untrue there would not be a finite critical temperature
before the attack). Clearly q⋆(ξ|k) = δξ1 for k /∈ S; any other choice would sacrifice
attack resources without benefit. The best defense against optimal attacks is the choice
for the degree distribution p(k) such that the above minimum over q is maximized.
3.3. Bounds on the process integrity measure
To judge the quality of attack strategies it will prove useful to have bounds on
the value Γ[p, q⋆[p]] corresponding to the optimal attack q⋆[p]. An upper bound is
easily obtained by inspecting the result of non-intelligent random attacks of the type
q(ξ|k) = (1−Q)δξ,0 +Qδξ,1, with 0 ≤ Q ≤ 1:
Γ[p, q] = [〈k2〉/〈k〉 − 1]Q (31)
Q ≥ 1− 1/κ〈φ(k)〉 (32)
The sharpest bound of this form follows when seeking equality in the last line, giving‡:
Γ[p, q⋆[p]] ≤ Γ[p, q⋆random I] =
(
1− 1
κ〈φ(k)〉
)
〈k(k−1)〉/〈k〉 (33)
If Ξ = {0, 1} then (33) is the best possible upper bound based on random attacks.
If Ξ = [0, 1] we can improve upon (33) by investigating random attacks of the form
q(ξ|k) = δ[ξ − ξˆ]. The optimal choice turns out to be ξˆ = 1−1/κ〈φ〉, giving
Γ[p, q⋆[p]] ≤ Γ[p, q⋆random II] =
(
1− 1
κ〈φ(k)〉
)2
〈k(k−1)〉/〈k〉 (34)
To find lower bounds for Γ[p, q⋆[p]] we first define modified probabilities π(k) ∈ [0, 1]:
π(k) =
∑
ξ∈Ξ(1−ξ)q(ξ|k)φ(k)p(k)〈∑
ξ∈Ξ(1−ξ)q(ξ|k)φ(k)
〉 (35)
‡ Note that κ〈φ(k)〉 > 1 due to our earlier ruling out of the trivial attack strategy q(ξ|k) = δξ,0.
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with associated averages written as 〈. . .〉π. Note that the denominator of (35) is
bounded from above by κ−1, via the resource constraint. We can now write
Γ[p, q] =
〈k(k−1)〉
〈k〉 −
1
〈k〉
∑
k
p(k)k(k−1)
∑
ξ∈Ξ
(1−ξ2)q(ξ|k)
=
〈k(k−1)〉
〈k〉 −
1
〈k〉
〈∑
ξ∈Ξ
(1−ξ)q(ξ|k)φ(k)
〉〈k(k−1)
φ(k)
∑
ξ∈Ξ(1−ξ2)q(ξ|k)∑
ξ∈Ξ(1−ξ)q(ξ|k)
〉
π
≥ 〈k(k−1)〉〈k〉 −
1
κ〈k〉
〈k(k − 1)
φ(k)
∑
ξ∈Ξ(1−ξ2)q(ξ|k)∑
ξ∈Ξ(1−ξ)q(ξ|k)
〉
π
≥ 〈k(k−1)〉〈k〉 −
CΞ
κ〈k〉
〈k(k − 1)
φ(k)
〉
π
(36)
in which the factor CΞ ≥ 0 depends only on the choice made for the value set Ξ:
CΞ = max
w
{1−〈ξ2〉w
1−〈ξ〉w
}
, with 〈f(ξ)〉w =
∑
ξ∈Ξ
w(ξ)f(ξ) and
∑
ξ∈Ξ
w(ξ) = 1
(37)
One easily proves using Ξ ⊆ [0, 1] that CΞ ∈ [1, 2], that C{0,1} = 1, and that C[0,1] = 2.
We conclude, in combination with (33,34), that
Ξ = {0, 1} : 1− 1
κ〈k(k−1)〉
〈k(k−1)
φ(k)
〉
π
≤ 〈k〉Γ[p, q
⋆[p]]
〈k(k−1)〉 ≤ 1−
1
κ〈φ(k)〉 (38)
Ξ = [0, 1] : 1− 2
κ〈k(k−1)〉
〈k(k−1)
φ(k)
〉
π
≤ 〈k〉Γ[p, q
⋆[p]]
〈k(k−1)〉 ≤
(
1− 1
κ〈φ(k)〉
)2
(39)
The lower bounds are satisfied with equality if the attack resources are exhausted and
if 〈(1− ξ2)〉q = 〈(1− ξ)〉q for each q(ξ|k) with k ∈ S; the last condition is always met
if Ξ = {0, 1}. However, the lower bounds still depend on the attack strategy via the
measure π. From (38,39) and the general property Γ[p, q] ≥ 0, which follows from the
definition of Γ[p, q], we finally obtain the strategy-independent bounds
Ξ = {0, 1} : max
{
0, 1− R/κ〈k(k−1)〉
}
≤ 〈k〉Γ[p, q
⋆[p]]
〈k(k−1)〉 ≤ 1−
1
κ〈φ(k)〉 (40)
Ξ = [0, 1] : max
{
0, 1− 2R/κ〈k(k−1)〉
}
≤ 〈k〉Γ[p, q
⋆[p]]
〈k(k−1)〉 ≤
(
1− 1
κ〈φ(k)〉
)2
(41)
with
R = maxk∈S
{
k(k−1)/φ(k)} (42)
The latter bounds reveal immediately two distinct situations where it is not possible
for any intelligent attack to improve on the damage done by random attacks: the case
φ(k) = k(k − 1) for all k ∈ S (here the benefit of degree knowledge exactly balances
the cost to the attacker of using it), and the case of regular random graphs, viz.
p(k) = δk,〈k〉, where there is no degree knowledge to be exploited in the first place.
4. Optimal attack and optimal defense for Ξ = {0, 1}
The attacker’s objective is to minimize Γ[p, q]. We have seen that for Ξ = {0, 1},
where nodes are either fully disabled or left alone and C{0,1} = 1, the lower bound in
(40) could in principle be realized. This will serve as an efficient guide in finding q⋆[p].
Attack strategies for Ξ = {0, 1} are of the form q(ξ|k) = q(0|k)δξ,0 + [1 − q(0|k)]δξ,1,
so we need to determine q(0|k) for all k ∈ S.
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4.1. Construction of the optimal attack strategy
We first define the attacker’s ‘target’ degree set A ⊆ S, with R as defined in (42):
A = {k ∈ S| k(k − 1)/φ(k) = R} (43)
The inequality 〈k(k−1)/φ(k)〉π ≤ R used in the final step of our derivation of (40) is
satisfied with equality only if π(k) = 0 for all k /∈ A. According to (35) this requires
q(ξ|k) = δξ,1 for all k /∈ A. The only remaining requirement for satisfying the lower
bound in (40) is that we satisfy the resource constraint with equality. Hence the set
of optimal attack strategies is defined strictly by the following demands:
∀k /∈ A : q(0|k) = 0 (44)
∀k ∈ A : q(0|k) ∈ [0, 1],
∑
k∈A
q(0|k)φ(k)p(k) = 1/κ (45)
It is straightforward to verify directly, using φ(k) = k(k− 1)/R for all k ∈ A,
that strategies satisfying these conditions indeed give the lowest possible value for
Γ[p, q] according to our bounds, and satisfy the resource constraint with equality. By
construction, the set A cannot be empty.
At this stage in our argument we must distinguish between two distinct cases. In
the first case the attacker need not look beyond nodes in the target set A (43), since
removing those will already exhaust or exceed his resources; he will simply remove as
many of those as can be afforded. In the second case the removal of all nodes in A
does not exhaust the attack resources, and new target sets need to be identified:
• The target set A is exhausting, ∑k∈A φ(k)p(k) ≥ 1/κ:
Here it is immediately clear that optimal attacks will indeed exist, i.e. the
conditions (44,45) can be met. Only nodes from A will be removed. If there
is at least one k⋆ ∈ A with φ(k⋆)p(k⋆) ≥ 1/κ, the attacker can simply execute
k⋆ = argmaxk∈A{φ(k)p(k)} (46)
q(0|k⋆) = 1/κp(k⋆)φ(k⋆), ∀k 6= k⋆ : q(0|k) = 0 (47)
If instead φ(k)p(k) < 1/κ for all k ∈ A there is no target degree in A which
would on its own exhaust the attacker’s resources. The attacker will first remove
all nodes with degree k⋆1 = argmaxk∈A{φ(k)p(k)} by setting q(0|k⋆1) = 1. He
will next direct attention to the reduced set A/{k⋆1} and remove nodes with
degree k⋆2 = argmaxk∈A/{k⋆
1
}{φ(k)p(k)}, etc, until the resources are exhausted.
At the end of this iterative process the attacker will have removed a sequence
of degrees {k⋆1 , · · · , k⋆L} ⊆ A (where nodes with degree k⋆L will generally be only
partially removed, as allowed by remaining resources). In words: the attacker
first determines the target set A of those degrees with p(k) > 0 for which the
ratio k(k − 1)/φ(k) is maximal. He then ranks the degrees in A according to
the value of φ(k)p(k) and proceeds to remove degrees iteratively according to
this ranking until his resources are exhausted. This strategy will always lead to
〈k(k − 1)/φ(k)〉π = R, and satisfy the lower bound in (40) with equality.
• The target set A is non-exhausting, ∑k∈A φ(k)p(k) < 1/κ:
Here the attacker can afford to remove completely all degrees in the set A, but
setting q(0|k) = 1 for all k ∈ A does not exhaust his resources. He should
subsequently direct attention to those nodes in the reduced set S/A for which the
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ratio k(k−1)/φ(k) is maximal, and so on. The result is again an iteration, at the
end of which the attacker will have removed a set of degrees {k⋆1 , · · · , k⋆L} ⊃ A
(where nodes with degree k⋆L will generally be only partially removed). In this
case 〈k(k − 1)/φ(k)〉 < R and the lower bound in (40) is no longer satisfied
with inequality; however, this does not imply that the strategy is non-optimal,
since it might be that the bound is no longer tight. Here it is therefore difficult
to prove rigorously that the identified strategy always constitutes the optimal
attack, but it is the logical continuation of the optimal attack identified earlier
and its optimality is consistent with numerical experiments (to be shown later).
We can combine both cases above in a transparent iterative attack protocol. We define
at each step ℓ: the target set Aℓ, the set Sℓ of nodes that have not yet been targeted,
and the resource remainder ∆ℓ = κ
−1 −∑k q(0|k)φ(k)p(k). The process is initialized
according to S0 = S and ∆0 = κ
−1, and starts with q(0|k) = 0 for all k. It is iterated
until ∆ℓ = 0, according to
step 1: calculate new ratio Rℓ = maxk∈Sℓ−1{k(k−1)/φ(k)}
step 2: identify target set Aℓ = {k ∈ Sℓ−1| k(k−1)/φ(k) = Rℓ}
step 3: choose (any) k⋆ℓ ∈ Aℓ for which φ(k⋆ℓ )p(k⋆ℓ ) = maxk∈Aℓ{φ(k)p(k)}
step 4: check whether attack resources can be exhausted:
φ(k⋆ℓ )p(k
⋆
ℓ ) ≥ ∆ℓ−1 : yes,
remove as many degree k⋆ℓ nodes as possible
set q(0|k⋆ℓ ) = ∆ℓ−1/φ(k⋆ℓ )p(k⋆ℓ )
∆ℓ = 0, attack terminates
φ(k⋆ℓ )p(k
⋆
ℓ ) < ∆ℓ−1 : no,
remove all degree k⋆ℓ nodes
set q(0|k⋆ℓ ) = 1
step 5: define Sℓ = Sℓ−1/k
⋆
ℓ and ∆ℓ = ∆ℓ−1 − φ(k⋆ℓ )p(k⋆ℓ )q(0|k⋆ℓ )
Always the end result is a sequence {k⋆1 , . . . , k⋆L−1} of target degrees that are fully
removed, possibly supplemented by a further degree k⋆L of which a fraction will be
removed (to exhaust fully the attack resources).
4.2. Properties of the optimal attack strategy
We next evaluate the impact of the above attack strategy q⋆[p] on our process integrity
measure. We define the set A⋆ = {k⋆1 , . . . , k⋆L−1} of fully removed degrees, and write
k⋆L simply as k
⋆. The post-attack value of the process integrity measure will be
Γ[p, q⋆[p]] =
〈k(k−1)〉
〈k〉 −
1
〈k〉
∑
k∈A⋆
p(k)k(k−1)− 1〈k〉q(0|k
⋆)k⋆(k⋆−1)p(k⋆)
=
〈k(k−1)〉
〈k〉 −
1
〈k〉
∑
k∈A⋆
p(k)k(k−1)− ∆L−1〈k〉
k⋆(k⋆−1)
φ(k⋆)
(48)
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The attack q⋆[p] exhausts all resources, so ∆L−1 = κ
−1 −∑k∈A⋆ φ(k)p(k). Hence
Γ[p, q⋆[p]] =
〈k(k−1)〉
〈k〉 −
1
〈k〉
∑
k∈A⋆
p(k)φ(k)
[k(k−1)
φ(k)
− k
⋆(k⋆−1)
φ(k⋆)
]
− k
⋆(k⋆−1)
κ〈k〉φ(k⋆) (49)
Since by definition k(k−1)/φ(k) > k⋆(k⋆−1)/φ(k⋆) for all k ∈ A⋆, both the second
and the third term of (49) are strictly non-positive.
The result (49) can be compared to that of the most damaging random attack
(where no degree information is used), viz. to (33). The benefit ∆Γ = Γ[p, q⋆[p]] −
Γ[p, q⋆random] to the attacker of using optimal intelligent attacks as opposed to optimal
random attacks then takes the form
∆Γ = − 1〈k〉
∑
k∈A⋆
p(k)φ(k)
[k(k−1)
φ(k)
− k
⋆(k⋆−1)
φ(k⋆)
]
− 1
κ〈k〉
[k⋆(k⋆−1)
φ(k⋆)
−〈k(k−1)〉〈φ(k)〉
]
= − 1〈k〉
∑
k∈A⋆
p(k)φ(k)
[k(k−1)
φ(k)
− k
⋆(k⋆−1)
φ(k⋆)
]
− 1
κ〈k〉 〈φ(k)〉
∑
k
p(k)φ(k)
[k⋆(k⋆−1)
φ(k⋆)
− k(k−1)
φ(k)
]
= − 1〈k〉
∑
k∈A⋆
p(k)φ(k)
[k(k−1)
φ(k)
− k
⋆(k⋆−1)
φ(k⋆)
](
1− 1
κ〈φ(k)〉
)
+
1
κ〈k〉 〈φ(k)〉
∑
k/∈A⋆
p(k)φ(k)
[k(k−1)
φ(k)
− k
⋆(k⋆−1)
φ(k⋆)
]
(50)
Since the set A⋆ ⊆ S is constructed specifically from those degrees for which
k(k − 1)/φ(k) is maximal, and since 〈φ(k)〉 > κ−1, both terms of ∆Γ are strictly
non-positive. One will thus generally have ∆Γ < 0. Again we also recognize the two
special cases where there will be no gain in intelligent attacks, namely φ(k) = k(k−1)
(with any degree distribution), and p(k) = δk,〈k〉 (with any cost function φ(k)).
In terms of the dependence of our results on the cost function φ(k) it is clear that
everything evolves around the dependence on k of the ratio φ(k)/k(k− 1). This ratio
represents for each k the balance between the cost of removing degree-k nodes versus
the benefits in terms of damage achieved. If for simplicity we choose φ(k) = kζ(k−1),
then for ζ < 1 the intelligent attack will be to take out first the nodes with the largest
degrees k ∈ S that can be removed without violating the resource constraint (i.e. the
‘greedy’ attack strategy is optimal), whereas for ζ > 1 the intelligent attack will target
first the nodes with the smallest degrees k ∈ S that can be removed without violating
the constraint (here attacking hubs is too expensive to be efficient). Furthermore, it is
not at all a priori clear what would be the most resistant degree distribution against
such attacks in the presence of resource constraints. Naively one could perhaps have
expected that for small ζ (where the attacker will target hubs) the best strategy for
the defender could be to choose a narrowly distributed degree distribution, so there
are no hubs to be exploited. Interestingly, we will see below that that is not the case,
and the optimal degree distribution can be more subtle.
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Species N 〈k〉 kmax Method Reference
C. Elegans 3512 3.72 524 Y2H [12]
C. Jejuni 1324 17.52 207 Y2H [13]
E. Coli 2457 7.05 641 PMS [14]
H. Sapiens 9306 7.53 247 HPRD [15]
S. Cerevisiae 3241 2.69 279 Y2H [16]
Table 1. Size N , average connectivity 〈k〉, maximum degree kmax, experimental
detection method or source, and reference for the biological (protei interaction)
network data sets used in our numerical experiments. The detection methods or
sources are abbreviated as follows: Y2H, Yeast two-hybrid; PMS, Purification-
Mass spectrometry; HPRD, the human protein reference database.
5. Numerical results
5.1. General methods
In this section we illustrate, apply and extend via numerical experimentation the
results derived above. We determine by numerical maximization the most resistant
degree distribution against optimal intelligent attacks, and we compare for typical
biological networks the effects of optimal intelligent attacks in terms of process
integrity against optimized random attacks and against the bounds established earlier.
The biological networks used are experimentally determined protein interaction
networks (PINs) of different species, namely C. Elegans, C. Jejuni, E. Coli, H. Sapiens
and S. Cerevisiae; see Table 1 for characteristics and references. For each biological
network we also generate several synthetic alternatives with the same size N and
average connectivity 〈k〉 as the biological one, but with different degree distributions:
Poissonian, the optimally resistant degree distribution, or a distribution generated
via preferential attachment with a fat tail similar to the biological network. In
all cases we choose node attack cost functions of the form φ(k) = kζ(k − 1), with
ζ = 0, 1, 2, and we set the attack resource limit to κ−1 = 〈φ(k)〉P/q, where q > 1 is a
control parameter and the average 〈. . .〉P is calculated over the Poissonian distribution
P(k) = 〈k〉ke〈k〉/k! For each PIN and each synthetically generated counterpart the
average cost function 〈φ(k)〉 is found to be always larger than or equal to the one
calculated over the equivalent Poissonian distribution (if ζ = 0, where φ(k) = k − 1,
equality of course holds trivially for all distributions since they share by construction
the value of 〈k〉). This ensures that for q > 1 the attacker’s resources will in all our
experiments be in the relevant regime 〈φ(k)〉 > κ−1. The optimally attack resistant
networks are found via a stochastic graph dynamics, starting from a biological protein
interaction network, in which at each step a bond is selected at random and is moved
to another location if this move increases the post-attack integrity measure Γ[p, q⋆[p]].
Bond relocations are the minimal moves that preserve the average degree of the
network. After each move, the optimal attack strategy q⋆[p] defined in the previous
section is applied to the new network. In order to prevent the graph dynamics from
getting stuck in suboptimal configurations, we allow initially for groups of bonds to
be moved, and as the algorithm proceeds the size of these groups is reduced, in the
spirit of [17].
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Figure 1. Left: log-log plot of the degree distribution of the H. Sapiens PIN,
synthetically generated networks with the same size N and average connectivity
〈k〉 as H. Sapiens PIN but with Poissonian and preferential attachment degree
distributions. Right: log-log plot of the degree distribution of the network that
has the same size and average connectivity as the H. Sapiens PIN, but that has
been constructed to be optimally resistant against optimal intelligent attacks,
given the node removal cost function φ(k) = kζ(k− 1), with ζ = 0, 1, 2, and given
available attack resources, characterized by κ−1 = 1
q
〈φ(k)〉P , with q = 3, 5 (see
legend). We observe that upon decreasing ζ, where the optimal attack strategy
starts targeting the high-degree nodes, the optimally resistant degree distribution
changes takes a binary form, describing a module of high-degree nodes in a sea of
unconnected nodes.
5.2. Degree statistics before and after network optimization
Figure 1 shows the results of applying the above procedures to the H. Sapiens PIN,
for ζ = 0, 1, 2 and q = 3, 5. For ζ = 1, 2 (where it is not advantageous to the attacker
to target high-degree nodes) the optimally resistant degree distribution p⋆[q] is seen to
exhibit a smooth dependence on the degree k. For ζ = 0, where the degree dependence
of node removal costs is modest and the optimal attack strategy is to target high degree
nodes, one could expect the optimal network to become regular, in order to disallow
attackers to benefit from degree information. Instead, we observe an entirely different
solution. Here, the optimal defender produces as many hubs as possible, so that the
attacker is unable to remove all of these. The result is a distribution of the form
p⋆(k) = (1− 〈k〉
K
)δk,0 +
〈k〉
K
δk,K , K ≥ 〈k〉 (51)
with K = 192 for a network with size and average connectivity identical to the H.
Sapiens PIN. In a situation where attackers can and will target nodes with maximal
degree first, it appears that the optimal defender chooses a network with a “modular”
configuration, with a core of nodes highly connected to each other, in a sea of
disconnected nodes. The attacker is prevented by resource limitations from removing
more than a (tiny) fraction of the core. The strategy of the optimal defender is to
sacrifice a few highly connected nodes to save many.
For distributions of the form (51) the attack resources can be exhausted, and the
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optimal attack is q⋆(0|k) = δk,K K/κφ(K)〈k〉. This results in
Γ[p, q⋆[p]] = K − 1−K1−ζ/κ〈k〉 (52)
Insertion into (40) shows that both bounds are now satisfied with equality. For
ζ > 0 the defender would wish to choose K as large as possible, but for a finite
network there is a limit. There are just N〈k〉/K connected nodes; if each of these
is to have K neighbours we must demand N〈k〉/K − 1 ≥ K, i.e. K ≤ Kc =√
N〈k〉 +O(N0). The same result follows from general entropic arguments [18, 19].
For large N the number of graphs with degree distribution p(k) equals exp[NS] where
S = 12 〈k〉[log(N/〈k〉)+1]−
∑
k p(k) log[p(k)/π(k)], with π(k) = e
−〈k〉〈k〉k/k!. For (51)
one obtains
S =
1
2
〈k〉
{
1− log
( K2
N〈k〉
)}
+O(K−1 logK) (53)
Again we obtain the cut-off point K ≤ Kc ≈
√
N〈k〉 for graphs with (51) to exist.
The value K = 192 found numerically, see Fig. 1, is consistent with this bound (for
H. Sapiens one has Kc = 264), but not identical to it. This is expected to reflect finite
size corrections to our theory, and the fact that the theory requires all relevant k to
be finite relative to N , whereas close to Kc one has k = O(
√
N).
Note, however, that the distribution chosen by the optimal defender is not always
exactly of the form (51). In some situations (depending on the amount of resources
available to the attacker) the peak at k = 0 is not strictly δ-shaped, so that K is
no longer subjected to the previously identified cut-off Kc, and one indeed observes
the second peak to move to higher values of K (albeit with a reduced height). This
results in a bimodal distribution with a δ-peak at some K > Kc and a broader peak
at k = 0, corresponding to a strongly disassortative network configuration (for the
notion of assortativity see e.g. [20]) where a small number of hubs are connected with
an extremely large number of low degree nodes (reminescent of results derived in [21]).
For this later distribution, as was the case with the bimodal distribution (51) with two
strictly δ-shaped peaks, the attacker will again exhaust his resources upon removal of
just a tiny fraction, q(0|K) = 1/κφ(K)p(K), of hubs.
The actual distribution p⋆(k) selected by the optimal defender when the attacker
is bound, by resource limitations, to play the strategy q⋆(0|k) = δk,K 1/κφ(k)p(k), is
the one which maximizes the minimal integrity measure
Γ(p, q⋆[p]) =
1
〈k〉
(
〈k(k − 1)〉 −
∑
k
p(k)k(k − 1)q(0|k)
)
(54)
=
1
〈k〉
(〈k(k − 1)〉 − κ−1K1−ζ) (55)
achieved by the attacker. It is clear that the shape of the optimally resistant
distribution will depend on the interplay between 〈k2〉 and K, which is controlled
by the resource limit κ−1. For ζ = 0 numerical studies show that for q sufficiently
small (large amount of resources) p⋆(k) assumes the shape (51), whereas for large q
(small amount of resources) the width of the peak at k = 0 increases and the second
peak moves to K ≫ Kc.
5.3. Values of process integrity measures before and after attacks
In Figure 2 we plot the integrity measure Γ[p, q], for the different network distributions
considered, before and after an optimal intelligent attack. We also show the values
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Figure 2. Values of the process integrity measure Γ[p, q] before attack (△), after
optimal intelligent attacks (∗), and after optimal random attacks (◦), for different
networks. The specific networks considered are experimentally determined
PINs of different species (C. Elegans, C. Jejuni, E. Coli, H. Sapiens and S.
Cerevisiae) and their synthetically generated counterparts with the same size and
average connectivity, but different degree distributions (Poissoninan, preferential
attachment and optimally attack resistant degree distribution following the attack
q⋆[p]). The node attack cost function is φ(k) = kζ(k − 1) and the available
attack resources are characterized by κ−1 = 〈φ(k)〉P/q, with ζ = 0, 1, 2 and
q = 3, 5 (see legends). The theoretical upper and lower bounds (40) are shown
as dotted and dashed lines, respectively. All results consistently reproduce the
built-in order Γbefore ≥ Γrandom ≥ Γintelligent (viz. △≥◦≥∗). Furthermore, the
network realizations are consistently ranked, with the optimally resistant network
(as expected) always outperforming the others, but with also the biological and
preferential attachment network outperforming their Poissonnian counterparts. In
fact, the degree of resistance of the optimally resistant network is quite remarkable.
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that the integrity measure would take after a random attack (where sites are picked up
at random and removed until resources are exhausted), with the same attack resource
limit. The node attack cost function and resource limit chosen are φ(k) = kζ(k−1)
and κ−1 = 〈φ(k)〉P/q, respectively, with ζ = 0, 1, 2 and q > 1. In addition we show
the lower and upper bounds (40) on the process integrity measure after an optimal
intelligent attack q⋆[p], as described by the protocol in the previous section, as dashed
and dotted lines. As expected, the data points for random attacks always coincide
with the dotted line of the theoretical upper bound (since such strategies formed the
basis from which the upper bound was derived). Optimally attack resistant degree
distributions are expected and indeed seen to be the ones for which the integrity
measure of the network process after optimal intelligent attack is highest, but when
quantified via Γ[p, q] as in the figure one is struck by how well they perform, i.e. by
the remarkably small reduction in the process integrity measure which they exhibit.
For ζ = 1, the theoretical lower and upper bounds coincide with each other, and with
the integrity measure values for random attacks and and optimal intelligent attacks.
Here φ(k) = k(k − 1), so costs and benefit for the attacker of degree knowledge
balance each other out, and we have already showed that there is then no scope for
the intelligent attacker to improve on the damage inflicted by random attacks. One can
often understand the actual values obtained for Γ[p, q]. The relative reduction of the
integrity measure before and after random attacks, for instance, can be calculated from
(40), and for our resource limit κ−1 = 〈φ(k)〉P/q, this gives (Γbefore−Γafter)/Γbefore =
〈φ(k)〉P/q〈φ(k)〉. For ζ = 0 this is always equal to 1/q; for ζ = 1, 2 it is small
for degree distributions with large second and third moments; much larger than for a
Poissonian distribution. Similarly, for optimal intelligent attacks equation (40) yield an
upper bound on the relative attack-induced reduction of the process integrity measure:
(Γbefore−Γafter)/Γbefore ≤
[〈kζ(k−1)〉P/q〈k(k−1)〉]maxk∈S{k1−ζ}. For ζ = 1, 2, this
change is again small for optimally resistant and biological networks, as a result of
their large degree variance (except for C. Jejuni, which is distinct due to an unusually
large average connectivity).
Our results re-confirm that random and hub-targeted attacks have similar effects
on Poissonian graphs, as often remarked in literature, due to the large homogeneity
of the degrees. For regular graphs they would have produced identical results.
However, one should be careful in concluding from this that processes running on
Poissonian networks are hence the most resistant ones against hub removal. On
the contrary, Fig. 2 shows that they are the most vulnerable ones, as their post-
attack integrity measure is smallest. Interestingly, we find that processes running
on networks produced by a preferential attachment mechanism are more resistant
than those running on Poissonian networks, against both random attacks and optimal
intelligent attacks. All this is due to the profound impact of resource constraints
on the network resilience problem. Moreover, the degree distributions found in
biological PINs generally exhibit, in turn, higher values for the post-attack process
integrity measure than both Poissonian and preferential attachment networks, for
random attacks and optimal intelligent attacks. A final feature emerging from Fig.
2 is that, while overall more robust compared to their preferential attachment and
Poisonnian counterparts, biological networks seem significantly more resilient against
random attacks than against hub-targeted attacks (see the top two panels with ζ = 0,
where the optimal attack indeed targets hubs).
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Figure 3. Scatter plots of the relative variation ∆Γ/Γ of the integrity measure
versus the fraction f of sites removed under optimal intelligent (left) and random
(right) attacks, with φ(k) = k − 1 and κ−1 = 〈φ(k)〉/3. Different markers
correspond to different network families. The biological family is composed of
the five experimentally determined PINs of Table 1. The other families are the
synthetically generated counterparts of the biological PINs, with the same size and
average connectivity, but different degree distributions (Poissonian, preferential
attachment and optimally resistant against intelligent attack).
5.4. Connection with results of previous studies - fraction of removed nodes
Previous studies of network resilience, based on analysis of static topological properties
of networks under attacks, had shown that power law networks (such as the ones
produced by a preferential attachment mechanism) are more resistant than Poissonian
ones against random removal of a fixed fraction of nodes (see e.g. [22, 23]), but are very
vulnerable against hub removal [1, 24]. In the light of our new results, one may wonder
how the fraction f of nodes removed varies among different degree distributions, when
considering attacks constrained by degree dependent node removal costs, with limited
attack resources. The results of numerical explorations for ζ = 0 (where optimal
attacks will target hubs) and q = 3 are shown in Fig. 3, in the form of scatter plots
of the relative variation ∆Γ/Γ = (Γbefore − Γafter)/Γbefore of the integrity measure
under optimal hub-targeted attacks versus the fraction of sites removed (left), and
under random attacks versus the fraction of nodes removed (right). The dotted line
in the latter plot shows the theoretically predicted (constant) value of the relative
variation of the process integrity measure under random attacks for ζ = 0. Figure 3
reveals that biological PINs are indeed affected by a dramatic drop in the integrity
measure under hub removal, even for tiny fractions of removed nodes; this confirms our
intuition that their observed resilience depends crucially on having degree statistics
such that attack costs prevent intelligent attackers from removing significant numbers
of hubs. The same statement is expected to apply to any random graph drawn from
the ensemble (4), where the imposed local degrees are those of the biological networks.
Finally, Fig. 3 also shows that, as expected, the fraction of sites removed during hub-
targeted attacks in a Poissonian graph, with fixed attack resources and when the node
removal cost function is monotonically increasing with k, is considerably larger than
in power law graphs. We conclude that the often claimed superiority of Poissonian
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Figure 4. Left: process integrity measure Γ[p, q] before and after optimal
intelligent and random attacks, when the node removal cost function is a constant,
φ(k) = 〈k〉−1, and attack resources are constrained according to κ−1 = 〈φ(k)〉/5.
The theoretical upper and lower bounds of (40) are shown as dotted and dashed
lines, respectively. Right: Scatter plot of the relative variation ∆Γ/Γ of the
integrity measure versus the fraction of sites removed under intelligent attacks,
with attack resources constrained according to κ−1 = 〈φ(k)〉/5 and with node
attack cost function φ(k) = 〈k〉−1. Here different markers correspond to different
network families, similar to Fig. 3.
networks over power law graphs for hub targeted attacks is strictly a consequence
of the decision to keep the fraction of removed sites fixed. This is consistent with
the findings in [3], where it was argued that power law networks are no longer more
fragile than Poissonian graphs against hub targeted attacks when one looks at the
number of removed links, and that the efficiency of hub removal in power law graphs
would mainly lie in the fact that this removes many more links than it would have in
Poissonian graphs.
In order to make contact with earlier results in literature, we consider below
optimal attacks calculated for the constant cost function φ(k) = φ. Here the effects of
attack costs should vanish from the problem, and our attacks should reduce to those
where the fraction f of degrees to be removed is kept fixed. In fact, from the resource
constraint one has f =
∑
k p(k)q(0|k) = 1/κφ. We plot in Fig. 4 (left) the integrity
measure Γ[p, q] for the different networks considered so far, before and after optimal
intelligent and random attacks, with constant cost function φ = 〈k〉 − 1 and resources
κ−1 = φ/5. In the right panel we show a scatter plot of the relative variation of
the process integrity measure under optimal intelligent attack versus the fraction of
removed sites, similar to Fig. 3. The fraction of removed sites is now constant, as
expected, and indeed equals 1/5 for our choice of the resource limit. We see that for
the constant node removal cost function the dependence of the post-attack integrity
measure on the degree distribution is drastically different from that in the case of
monotonically increasing cost functions, and we retrieve the old results known from
literature: power law networks are now more resilient than Poissonian ones against
random attacks, but are extremely sensitive to hub removal.
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Figure 5. Log-plot of the post-attack integrity measure for the case where
assumed and actual node removal costs and resource constraints need not be
identical. Our network has the size and average connectivity of the C. Elegans
PIN. The node removal cost function is taken from a family φℓ(k) and the resource
constraint is κ−1
ℓ
= 〈φℓ(k)〉/qℓ, with ℓ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (see main text for further
details). The defender assumes that ℓ = d and chooses the associated optimally
resistant degree distribution, whereas the actual value is ℓ = a, and the attacker
bases his strategy on the latter. The defender is optimally prepared only for a = d.
5.5. Misinformation
We finally illustrate briefly the possible effects on the network resilience problem of
misinformation, i.e. a situation where a network is designed to be optimally resistant
against an optimal intelligent attack on the basis of a node removal cost function
φd(k) and a resource limit κ
−1
d , but where in fact it faces an optimal intelligent attack
constrained by an actual cost function φa(k) and with resource limit κ
−1
a . Here the
cost functions φℓ(k) and resource limits κ
−1
ℓ are defined as follows (with integer ℓ ≥ 1):
φ1(k) = 〈k〉−1, φℓ>1(k) = kℓ−2(k−1), and κ−1ℓ = 〈φℓ(k)〉/qℓ with q1 = 5 and qℓ>1 = 3.
Note that for a = 3 the intelligent attacks in fact reduce to random ones. The results
of our numerical explorations are shown in Fig 5. For every attack, the distribution
for which the post-attack process integrity measure is largest is indeed seen to be the
one which is optimally resistant to the actual attack, i.e. the choice d = a (for d = 3, 4
the optimally resistant degree distributions are very similar, and their behaviour is
almost identical). Fig 5 suggests that, as long as the node removal cost functions are
monotonically increasing with the node degree (i.e. for a ≥ 2), networks which are
optimally resistant against non-hub attacks (a = 3, 4) are reasonably resistant against
hub-targeted attacks (a = 2), whereas networks which are well prepared against hub-
targeted attacks behave quite poorly when subjected to non-hub attacks (a = 3, 4). In
other words, degree statistics designed to be optimally resistant against hub removal
appear to be quite sensitive to misinformation, whereas those optimally resistant to
random attacks suffer less from misinformation, at least as long as the node removal
cost function is monotonically increasing with the node degree.
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6. Discussion
Many research papers have been devoted recently to the resilience of networks under
attacks. Most study resilience in terms of the behaviour of static properties of
networks under random and inteligent removal of a fixed fraction of sites or bonds.
Results obtained empirically [1, 25] or analytically (within mean-field and asymptotic
approximations) [7, 2, 26, 6, 27] have shown that power law networks are more resistant
than Poissonian ones against random attacks (see e.g. [22, 23]), but are very vulnerable
against hub removal [1, 24]. In contrast, more recent studies [3] suggest that power
law networks are not more fragile than Poissonian graphs against hub-targeted attacks
when one looks at the number of removed links (as opposed to nodes).
In this paper we have sought to study network resilience in a more realistic setting,
where attackers have fixed resources and where removing or disrupting a node carries a
cost for the attacker which depends on the degree of the disrupted node. We quantify
the resilience of the system in terms of the process for which the network acts as
infrastructure, based on determining the critical temperatures for the onset of various
types of global order that could be envisaged (the resulting network integrity measure
is only weakly dependent upon the specific choices made). This formulation also allows
for attacks involving partial disruption of individual nodes, which would have been
inaccessible to the techniques normally used when studying network resilience, such as
percolation theory. We can define precisely the most damaging attack strategy, given
knowledge of the degree sequence of a network, and for any given node removal cost
function. In addition we could subsequently define the optimal network topology, i.e.
the degree distribution for which the integrity of the collective process is preserved
best when attacked by a foe who employs the most damaging attack strategy.
A network’s resilience against attacks is extremely sensitive to the dependence of
the node removal cost function on the degree of the targeted node. This dependence
determines the crucial outcome of the competition in such scenarios between the
benefit and the cost of attacking high-degree nodes. If we choose a trivial constant
cost function, we retrieve results from literature on network resilience under random
and targeted removal of fixed fractions of sites or bonds. However, as soon as one
chooses more realistic node removal cost functions, that increase sufficiently fast with
the node’s degree, power law networks are found to be more resistant than Poissonian
ones, even against optimized intelligent attacks. Our results show that “modular”
configurations with a core of nodes highly connected to each other, in a sea of (almost)
disconnected nodes, and strongly disassortative configurations, are, depending on the
attacker’s resources, the most resistant ones against hub-targeted attacks, respectively.
Broad distributions with fat tails are the best defence against random and low degree
targeted attacks. We also touched briefly upon the effects of misinformation, where a
network is designed to be optimally resistant to a certain attack, whereas it actually
faces a different one. Results suggest that for monotonically increasing cost functions,
degree distributions with fat tails are much less sensitive to misinformation effects.
Upon comparing real protein interaction networks with random networks of the
same size and average degree, we found that the attack resilience of the biological
networks is superior to that of power law and Poissonian ones, even against optimized
intelligent attacks. It may be that topological properties beyond the degree sequence
play an important role here, and this deserves further investigation. In particular, one
could calculate the integrity measure for processes supported by networks drawn from
ensembles tailored to the production of graphs with built-in structure beyond that
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imposed by the degree distribution, along the lines of [28, 18]. Another direction for
future work may be to consider graph ensembles in which both the network topologies
and the node removal cost functions involve hidden variables.
Our paper emphasises the importance of distinguishing between different classes
of network attacks on the basis of the node removal cost function and resource
limitations imposed upon the attacker, and of studying and quantifying network
resilience strictly within a given class of attacks. Previously proposed conclusions
about the vulnerability of power law networks against intelligent attacks should be
moderated in all cases where there is no compelling reason to assume that the cost to
attackers of node removal is independent of the node degrees.
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Appendix A. Equilibrium analysis for model A
Most of the derivations in both appendices follow the lines of similar calculations in
e.g. [28, 29], and we will hence be brief and highlight only crucial steps to indicate
the changes generated by the introduction of the attack variables {ξi}. Following [18]
we use the property that with 〈k〉 = N−1∑i ki the ensemble (4) is identical to
Prob(c) =
δk,k(c)
Z
∏
i<j
[ 〈k〉
N
δcij ,1+(1−
〈k〉
N
)δcij ,0
]
(A.1)
Z =
∑
c
δk,k(c)
∏
i<j
[ 〈k〉
N
δcij ,1+(1−
〈k〉
N
)δcij ,0
]
(A.2)
Appendix A.1. Derivation of saddle-point equations
We write the Kronecker δs of the degree constraints in integral form, and we introduce
the short-hands σi = (σ
1
i , . . . , σ
n
i ) ∈ {−1, 1}n so that
fA = lim
N→∞
lim
n→0
1
βnN
{
logZ − log
∑
σ1...σN
∫ π
−π
∏
i
[dωi
2π
eiωiki
]
×
∏
i<j
(
1 +
〈k〉
N
[
∫
dJ P (J)eβJξiξjσi·σj−i(ωi+ωj)− 1]
)}
= lim
N→∞
lim
n→0
1
βnN
{
logZ − log
∑
σ1...σN
∫ π
−π
∏
i
[dωi
2π
eiωiki
]
× exp
[ 〈k〉
2N
∑
ij
[
∫
dJ P (J)eβJξiξjσi·σj−i(ωi+ωj)− 1] +O(N0)
]}
(A.3)
We proceed by introducing for σ ∈ {−1, 1}n and ξ ∈ Ξ the functions
D(ξ,σ|{σi, ωi, ǫi}) = N−1
∑
i δξ,ξiδσ,σie
−iωi . They are introduced via the
substitution of integrals over appropriate δ-distributions, written in integral form:
1 =
∫
dD(ξ,σ)dDˆ(ξ,σ)
2π/N
eiNDˆ(ξ,σ)[D(ξ,σ)−D(ξ,σ|{σi,ωi,ǫi})] (A.4)
Upon using the short hand {dDdDˆ} =∏ǫ,σ D(ǫ,σ)dDˆ(ǫ,σ) we then obtain
fA = lim
N→∞
lim
n→0
1
βnN
{
logZ−log
∫
{dDdDˆ}eiN
∑
ǫσ Dˆ(ǫ,σ)D(ǫ,σ)−
1
2
N〈k〉+O(logN)
× exp
[1
2
〈k〉N
∑
ǫǫ′
∑
σσ′
D(ǫ,σ)D(ǫ′,σ′)
∫
dJ P (J)eβJǫǫ
′σ·σ′
]
× exp
[
N
∑
ξk
p(ξ, k) log
∑
σ
∫ π
−π
dω
2π
eiωk−iDˆ(ξ,σ)e
−iω
]}
(A.5)
We next define z = limN→∞N
−1 logZ (anticipating this limit to exist), which allows
us to evaluate f by steepest descent:
fA = lim
n→0
1
n
extr{D,Dˆ}fn,A[{D, Dˆ}] (A.6)
fn,A[. . .] = − 1
β
{
i
∑
ξσ
Dˆ(ξ,σ)D(ξ,σ)− 1
2
〈k〉 − z
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+
1
2
〈k〉
∑
ξξ′
∑
σσ′
D(ξ,σ)D(ξ′,σ′)
∫
dJ P (J)eβJξξ
′σ·σ′
+
∑
ξk
p(ξ, k) log
∑
σ
∫ π
−π
dω
2π
eiωk−iDˆ(ξ,σ)e
−iω
}
(A.7)
Extremization (A.7) with respect to {D, Dˆ} gives the saddle-point equations:
Dˆ(ξ,σ) = i〈k〉
∑
ξ′
∑
σ′
D(ξ′,σ′)
∫
dJ P (J)eβJξξ
′σ·σ′ (A.8)
D(ξ,σ) =
∑
k
p(ξ, k)
∫ π
−πdω e
iω(k−1)−iDˆ(ξ,σ)e−iω∑
σ′
∫ π
−π
dω eiωk−iDˆ(ξ,σ′)e−iω
(A.9)
The second of these equations is simplified using the identity∫ π
−π
dω eiωℓ−iDˆ(ξ,σ)e
−iω
=
{
2π[−iDˆ(ξ,σ)]ℓ/ℓ! if ℓ ≥ 0
0 if ℓ < 0
(A.10)
So, if we also re-define Dˆ(ξ,σ) = i〈k〉F (ξ,σ), we arrive at
F (ξ,σ) =
∑
ξ′
∑
σ′
D(ξ′,σ′)
∫
dJ P (J)eβJξξ
′σ·σ′ (A.11)
D(ξ,σ) =
∑
k>0
p(ξ, k)
k
〈k〉
F k−1(ξ,σ)∑
σ′ F
k(ξ,σ′)
(A.12)
We note that
∑
ξ
∑
σ D(ξ,σ)F (ξ,σ) = 1 at the saddle-point. The term z =
limN→∞N
−1 logZ measures the number of graphs in the ensemble. It follows from
limβ→0(βf) = − log 2, giving z = 〈k〉 log〈k〉 − 〈k〉 −
∑
k p(k) log k!, and hence
fA = − lim
n→0
1
βn
∑
ξk
p(ξ, k) log
[∑
σ
F k(ξ,σ)
]
(A.13)
Appendix A.2. Replica symmetric theory
To take the required limit n → 0 in our formulae we make the replica-symmetric
(RS) ansatz. The order parameter D(ξ,σ) must now be invariant under all replica
permutations, and thus have the following form:
D(ξ,σ) =
∫
dh D(ξ, h)
eβh
∑
α
σα
[2 cosh(βh)]n
(A.14)
Via equations (A.11,A.12) one then finds a similar structure for F (k,σ),
F (ξ,σ) =
∫
dh F (ξ, h) eβh
∑
α
σα (A.15)
and in the limit n→ 0, after some standard manipulations, a closed set of transparant
equations for the RS order parameters D(ξ, h) and F (ξ, h):
F (ξ, h) =
∑
ξ′
∫
dh′dJ D(ξ′, h′)P (J)δ
[
h− 1
β
atanh[tanh(βJξξ′) tanh(βh′)]
]
(A.16)
D(ξ, h) =
∑
k
p(ξ, k)
k
〈k〉
∫∏
ℓ<k[dhℓF (ξ, hℓ)]δ[h−
∑
ℓ<k hℓ]
[
∫
dh′F (ξ, h′)]k
(A.17)
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We note upon integrating and combining these equations that
∫
dh F (ξ, h) =∑
ξ′
∫
dh D(ξ′, h) = 1. This enables us to write F (ξ, h) = F (h|ξ) with ∫ dh F (h|ξ) = 1,
which gives immediate probabilistic interpretations of the functions F (h|ξ). Upon
eliminating D(ξ, h) the RS saddle-point equations then take the new form
F (h|ξ) =
∑
kξ′
p(ξ′, k)
k
〈k〉
∫
dJ P (J)
∫ ∏
ℓ<k
[dhℓF (hℓ|ξ′)]
× δ
[
h− 1
β
atanh[tanh(βJξξ′) tanh(β
∑
ℓ<k
hℓ)]
]
(A.18)
Clearly F (h|0) = δ(h). To identify the relevant observables and calculate for
σ ∈ {−1, 1}n the quantity P (ξ, k,σ) = limN→∞N−1
∑
i 〈δξ,ξiδk,kiδσ,σi〉 one uses
the alternative form of the replica identity, viz.
〈g(σ)〉 =
[∑
σ g(σ)e
−βH(σ)∑
σ e
−βH(σ)
]
= lim
n→0
∑
σ1...σn
g(σ1)e−β
∑
n
α=1
H(σα) (A.19)
Upon also making the RS ansatz this results in
PRS(ξ, k,σ) = p(ξ, k)
∫
dh W (h|ξ, k) e
βh
∑
α
σα
[2 cosh(βh)]n
(A.20)
W (h|ξ, k) =
∫ ∏
ℓ≤k
[dhℓF (hℓ|ξ)]δ[h−
∑
ℓ≤k
hℓ] (A.21)
The measureW (h|ξ, k) is the effective field distribution for those sites where (ξi, ki) =
(ξ, k). We note that W (h|0, k) = δ(h). With W (h) = ∑ξk p(ξ, k)W (h|ξ, k) we
can write the conventional scalar order parameters m = limN→∞N
−1
∑
i 〈σi〉 and
q = limN→∞N
−1
∑
i 〈σi〉2 in their familiar forms
m =
∫
dh W (h) tanh(βh), q =
∫
dh W (h) tanh2(βh) (A.22)
The subset of sites with (ξi, ki) = (ξ, k) can be regarded as sublattices in the
sense of [30], and we can define sublattice magnetizations m(ξ, k) via m(ξ, k) =∫
dh W (h|ξ, k) tanh(βh), such that m = ∑ξk p(ξ, k)m(ξ, k). In the limit T → ∞
(i.e. β → 0) the only solution of (A.18) is as always the trivial paramagnetic (P) one:
F (h|ξ) = δ(h). This is a saddle-point at any temperature, but can become unstable
in favour of ferromagnetic (F) or spin-glass (SG) states as T is lowered.
Appendix A.3. Continuous phase transitions away from the paramagnetic state
Continuous bifurcations away from the trivial state are found as usual by expanding
(A.18) in moments of F (h|ξ), assuming the existence of a small parameter ǫ with
0< |ǫ|≪1 such that ∫ dh hℓF (h|ξ) = O(ǫℓ). With some foresight we define a function
γ(ξ) and two |Ξ|×|Ξ| matrices M (ℓ)(β) with entries M (ℓ)ξξ′ (β), for ℓ ∈ {1, 2}:
γ(ξ) = 〈k〉−1
∑
k
p(ξ, k)k(k − 1) (A.23)
M
(ℓ)
ξξ′ (β) = γ(ξ
′)
∫
dJ P (J) tanhℓ(βJξξ′) (A.24)
We define λ
(ℓ)
max(β) as the largest eigenvalue of M (ℓ)(β). If the first order to bifurcate
away from F (h|ξ) = δ(h) is ǫ1, the bifurcation is towards a state where m 6= 0,
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i.e. describing a P→F transition. Upon multiplying both sides of (A.18) by h and
integrating over h, the bifurcation condition for this is found to be
P→ F : λ(1)max(β) = 1 (A.25)
If instead the first order to bifurcate is ǫ2, the bifurcating new state has m = 0 and
q > 0, describing a P→SG transition. Upon multiplying both sides of (A.18) by h2
and integrating over h, the bifurcation condition for this is found to be
P→ SG : λ(2)max(β) = 1 (A.26)
We focus on a specific simple bond distribution, the binary P (J) = 12 (1+η)δ(J−J0)+
1
2 (1−η)δ(J+J0) (with J0 ≥ 0), where the matrices M (ℓ)(β) take the simple form:
M
(1)
ξξ′ (β) = η tanh(βJ0ξξ
′)γ(ξ′) M
(2)
ξξ′ (β) = tanh
2(βJ0ξξ
′)γ(ξ′) (A.27)
Appendix B. Equilibrium analysis for model B
Appendix B.1. Derivation of saddle-point equations
The calculation for coupled oscillators is initially very similar to the previous one, with
summations replaced by integrations. The main differences start at the introduction
of the replica-symmetry ansatz; from then onwards we have to implement appropriate
adaptations of the calculation for XY spins in [29] (an alternative route would be
to adapt the cavity-based analysis in [31]). As before we write degree constraints in
integral form, and we introduce the short-hands θi = (θ
1
i , . . . , θ
n
i ) ∈ [−π, π]n so that
fB = lim
N→∞
lim
n→0
1
βnN
{
logZ − log
∫ π
−π
dθ1 . . .dθN
∫ π
−π
∏
i
[dωi
2π
eiωiki
]
× exp
[ 〈k〉
2N
∑
ij
[
∫
dJ P (J)eβJξiξj
∑
α
cos(θαi −θ
α
j )−i(ωi+ωj)−1] +O(N0)
]}
(B.1)
We next introduce for θ ∈ [−π, π]n and ξ ∈ {0, 1} the functions D(ξ, θ|{θi, ωi, ǫi}) =
N−1
∑
i δξ,ξiδ[θ, θi]e
−iωi , via the substitution of functional integrals over appropriate
δ-distributions, written in integral form. With the short hand {dDdDˆ} =∏
ǫ,θD(ǫ, θ)dDˆ(ǫ, θ) we then obtain an expression in the form of path integral:
fB = lim
N→∞
lim
n→0
1
βnN
{
logZ−log
∫
{dDdDˆ}eiN
∑
ǫ
∫
dθDˆ(ǫ,θ)D(ǫ,θ)− 1
2
N〈k〉+O(logN)
× exp
[1
2
〈k〉N
∑
ǫǫ′
∫
dθdθ′D(ǫ, θ)D(ǫ′, θ′)
∫
dJ P (J)eβJǫǫ
′
∑
α
cos(θα−θ
′
α)
]
× exp
[
N
∑
ξk
p(ξ, k) log
∫ π
−π
dθ
∫ π
−π
dω
2π
eiωk−iDˆ(ξ,θ)e
−iω
]}
(B.2)
With z = limN→∞N
−1 logZN = 〈k〉 log〈k〉 − 〈k〉 −
∑
k p(k) log k! (which has already
been calculated earlier), we evaluate f by steepest descent:
fB = lim
n→0
1
n
extr{D,Dˆ}fn,B[{D, Dˆ}] (B.3)
fn,B[. . .] = − 1
β
{
i
∑
ξ
∫
dθ Dˆ(ξ, θ)D(ξ, θ)− 1
2
〈k〉 − z
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+
1
2
〈k〉
∑
ξξ′
∫
dθdθ′D(ξ, θ)D(ξ′, θ′)
∫
dJ P (J)eβJξξ
′
∑
α
cos(θα−θ
′
α)
+
∑
ξk
p(ξ, k) log
∫ π
−π
dθ
∫ π
−π
dω
2π
eiωk−iDˆ(ξ,θ)e
−iω
}
(B.4)
Functional variation of (B.3) with respect to {D, Dˆ}, followed by application of (A.10)
and transformation via Dˆ(ξ, θ) = i〈k〉F (ξ, θ), gives the saddle-point equations
F (ξ, θ) =
∑
ξ′
∫
dθ′ D(ξ′, θ′)
∫
dJ P (J)eβJξξ
′
∑
α
cos(θα−θ
′
α) (B.5)
D(ξ, θ) =
∑
k>0
p(ξ, k)
k
〈k〉
F k−1(ξ, θ)∫
dθ′ F k(ξ, θ′)
(B.6)
Again
∑
ξ
∫
dθ D(ξ, θ)F (ξ, θ) = 1 at the saddle-point, and we obtain
fB = − lim
n→0
1
βn
∑
ξk
p(ξ, k) log
[ ∫
dθ F k(ξ, θ)
]
(B.7)
Appendix B.2. Replica symmetric theory
For real-valued variables the replica-symmetric ansatz is less straightforward.
Permutation invariance with respect to θ components now implies that D(ξ, θ) and
F (ξ, θ) are functional integrals over the space of normalized functions P : [−π, π]→ IR
(i.e.
∫ π
−πdθ P (θ) = 1), with functional measures WD[ξ, {P}] and WF [ξ, {P}]:
D(ξ, θ) =
∫
{dP} WD[ξ, {P}]
∏
α
P (θα) (B.8)
F (ξ, θ) =
∫
{dP} WF [ξ, {P}]
∏
α
P (θα) (B.9)
(we may use the same symbol P as employed to define the bond probabilities via
P (J), the arguments will always prevent ambiguity). Insertion of (B.8,B.9) into the
two equations (B.5,B.6) then gives, in the limit n→ 0 and after some manipulations,
the following closed equations for the RS measures WD[ξ, {P}] and WF [ξ, {P}]:
WF [ξ, {P}] =
∑
ξ′
∫
{dP ′}WD[ξ′, {P ′}]
∫
dJP (J)
×
∏
θ
δ
[
P (θ)−
∫
dθ′eβJξξ
′ cos(θ−θ′)P ′(θ′)
2πI0(βJξξ′)
]
(B.10)
WD[ξ, {P}] =
∑
k>0
p(ξ, k)k/〈k〉[ ∫{dP ′}WF [ξ, {P ′}]]k
∫ ∏
ℓ<k
[
{dPℓ}WF [ξ, {Pℓ}]
]
×
∏
θ
δ
[
P (θ)−
∏
ℓ<k Pℓ(θ)∫
dθ′
∏
ℓ<k Pℓ(θ
′)
]
(B.11)
Functional integration of both equations over P shows that
∫ {dP}WF [ξ, {P}] =∑
ξ′
∫ {dP}WD[ξ′, {P}] = 1. This allows us to write WF [ξ, {P}] = WF [{P}|ξ] with∫ {dP}WF [{P}|ξ] = 1, which allows also here for probabilistic interpretations of
the order parameters WF [ξ, {P}], which are now functionals acting on the space of
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probability distributions over the interval [−π, π]. Upon eliminating WD[ξ, {P}] the
RS saddle-point equations then take the following form (where θ, θ′ ∈ [−π, π]):
WF [{P}|ξ] =
∑
kξ′
p(ξ′, k)
k
〈k〉
∫
dJ P (J)
∫ ∏
ℓ<k
[
{dPℓ}WF [{Pℓ}|ξ′]
]
×
∏
θ
δ
[
P (θ)−
∫
dθ′ eβJξξ
′ cos(θ−θ′)
∏
ℓ<k Pℓ(θ
′)
2πI0(βJξξ′)
∫
dθ′
∏
ℓ<k Pℓ(θ
′)
]
(B.12)
We observe that WF [{P}|0] =
∏
θ δ[P (θ) − (2π)−1]. To identify the physical
meaning of our observables we define and calculate the quantity P (ξ, k, θ) =
limN→∞N
−1
∑
i 〈δξ,ξiδk,kiδ[θ, θi]〉. Within the RS ansatz it is found to be
PRS(ξ, k, θ) = p(ξ, k)
∫
{dP} W [{P}|ξ, k]
∏
α
P (θα) (B.13)
W [{P}|ξ, k] =
∫ ∏
ℓ≤k
[
{dPℓ}WF [{Pℓ}|ξ]
]∏
θ
δ
[
P (θ)−
∏
ℓ≤k Pℓ(θ)∫
dθ′
∏
ℓ≤k Pℓ(θ
′)
]
(B.14)
The functional measure W [{P}|ξ, k] generalizes the concept of an effective field to
an ‘effective’ angle distribution of those oscillators with (ξi, ki) = (ξ, k). Note that
W [{P}|0, k] = ∏θ δ[P (θ) − (2π)−1]. With W [{P}] = ∑ξk p(ξ, k)W [{P}|ξ, k] we can
write the conventional types of scalar order parameters in a compact form:
lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
〈f(θi)〉 =
∫
{dP}W [{P}]
∫ π
−π
dθ P (θ)f(θ) (B.15)
lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
〈f(θi)〉〈g(θi)〉 =
∫
{dP}W [{P}]
[∫ π
−π
dθ P (θ)f(θ)
][∫ π
−π
dθ P (θ)g(θ)
]
(B.16)
For T →∞ (i.e. β → 0) the only solution of our equations is the trivial P state of fully
random phases θi: WF [{P}|ξ] =W [{P}|ξ, k] =W [{P}] =
∏
θ δ[P (θ)−(2π)−1], which
solves out equations at any temperature, but will destabilize at some T in favour of
ordered states with (partially) frozen relations between the phases of the oscillators.
Appendix B.3. Continuous phase transitions away from the incoherent state
To find continuous bifurcations away from the incoherent (P) state one has to carry
out a Guzai expansion [29] of the functional order parameter equations (B.12) around
the solution WF [{P}|ξ] =
∏
θ δ[P (θ)−(2π)−1]. This will involve the modified Bessel
functions Im(z) [32]. One writes P (θ) = (2π)
−1+∆(θ) and WF [{P}|ξ]→ W˜ [{∆}|ξ],
with W˜ [{∆}|ξ] = 0 as soon as ∫ π−πdθ ∆(θ) 6= 0 and one expands (B.12) in ∆(θ):
W˜ [{∆}|ξ] =
∑
kξ′
p(ξ′, k)
k
〈k〉
∫
dJ P (J)
∫ ∏
ℓ<k
[
{d∆ℓ}W˜ [{∆ℓ}|ξ′]
]
×
∏
θ
δ
[
∆(θ) − 1
2πI0(βJξξ′)
∑
ℓ<k
∫
dθ′ eβJξξ
′ cos(θ−θ′)∆ℓ(θ
′)
−1
2
k−1∑
ℓ 6=ℓ′
∫
dθ′
(eβJξξ′ cos(θ−θ′)
I0(βJξξ′)
− 1
)
∆ℓ(θ
′)∆ℓ′(θ
′) +O(∆3)

(B.17)
We next evaluate functional moments of both sides of this equation. If the first
bifurcation away from the P state is of order ∆, we multiply by ∆(θ) and integrate
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(functionally) over all ∆, leading to an eigenvalue problem for the functions Ψξ(θ) =∫ {d∆}W˜ [{∆}|ξ]∆(θ) subject to the constraint ∫ π−π dθ Ψξ(θ) = 0:
Ψξ(θ) =
∑
ξ′
γ(ξ′)
∫
dJ P (J)
I0(βJξξ′)
∫ π
−π
dθ′
2π
eβJξξ
′ cos(θ−θ′)Ψξ′(θ
′) (B.18)
with γ(ξ) as defined in (A.23). The solutions are of the form Ψξ(θ) = ψ(ξ)e
imθ, with
m ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} and with ψ(ξ) to be solved from the eigenvalue equation
O(∆) bifurcations : ψ(ξ) =
∑
ξ′
(∫
dJ P (J)
Im(βJξξ
′)
I0(βJξξ′)
)
γ(ξ′)ψ(ξ′) (B.19)
For m = 1 the bifurcating state (F) is one where the oscillators synchronize (partly)
to a preferred overall phase, whereas for m > 1 the transition is towards a state with
non-uniform phase statistics but without global synchronization [29].
If the first bifurcation away from the P state is of order ∆2 rather than ∆,
so
∫ {d∆}W˜ [{∆}|ξ]∆(θ) = 0, we multiply (B.17) by ∆(θ1)∆(θ2) and integrate over
all functions ∆, leading to an eigenvalue problem for the function Ψξ(θ1, θ2) =∫ {d∆}W˜ [{∆}|ξ]∆(θ1)∆(θ2) subject to ∫ π−π dθ1 Ψξ(θ1, θ2) = ∫ π−π dθ2 Ψξ(θ1, θ2) = 0:
Ψξ(θ1, θ2) =
∑
ξ′
γ(ξ′)
∫
dJ P (J)
I20 (βJξξ
′)
∫ π
−π
dθ′1dθ
′
2
4π2
eβJξξ
′[cos(θ1−θ
′
1
)+cos(θ2−θ
′
2
)]Ψξ′(θ
′
1, θ
′
2)
(B.20)
The solutions are of the form Ψξ(θ1, θ2) = ψ(ξ)e
i(m1θ1+m2θ2) with m1,2 ∈
{1, 2, 3, . . .}, representing new states with ‘frozen’ local phase ordering but no global
synchronization, i.e. spin-glass type states (SG), each bifurcating when
O(∆2) bifurcations : ψ(ξ) =
∑
ξ′
( ∫
dJ P (J)
Im1(βJξξ
′)Im2(βJξξ
′)
I20 (βJξξ
′)
)
γ(ξ′)ψ(ξ′)
(B.21)
The right-hand sides of both (B.19) and (B.21) vanish at β = 0, so the transitions
correspond to the smallest β such that solutions of (B.19) and (B.21) exist. Hence
we need the maxima of the right-hand sides over m and (m1,m2), respectively. The
properties of the modified Bessel functions (see e.g. [29]) ensure that these maxima
are found for m = 1 and (m1,m2) = (1, 1). Finally, if we again choose the bond
distribution P (J) = 12 (1+η)δ(J−J0) + 12 (1−η)δ(J+J0), the bifurcation conditions
can once more be written in the form (A.25,A.26), but where in the case of coupled
oscillators the largest eigenvalues λ
(1)
max and λ
(2)
max refer to the following matrices
M
(1)
ξξ′ (β) = η
I1(βJ0ξξ
′)
I0(βJξξ′)
γ(ξ′), M
(2)
ξξ′ (β) =
I21 (βJ0ξξ
′)
I20 (βJ0ξξ
′)
γ(ξ′) (B.22)
Comparison with (A.27) shows that, inasmuch as the location of the transition lines
away from the P state is concerned, the differences between having interacting Ising
spins or coupled oscillators on the nodes of the network are accounted for by the simple
substitution tanh(z)→ I1(z)/I0(z) in the relevant remaining eigenvalue problem.
